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I 
Abstract 
Chinese gradual and piecemeal reform has generated dual labour market sectors: the 
state sector vs. the non-state sector. One important feature of reforms in the state 
sector is that balancing the objective of maintaining social stability against that of 
improving productivity is highlighted. In this thesis I suggest that this trade-off is 
inherent in the policy of xiagang which allows state owned enterprises to layoff 
workers but forces them to continue providing some wages and non-wage benefits. 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the relationship between social stability and a 
range of variables such as wages, effort levels, employment, output, productivity and 
profitability. To fulfill it, this thesis builds a theoretical model that extends the 
Shapiro and Stiglitz no-shirking efficiency wage model to include characteristics of 
the Chinese context. The most important innovation in this model is the introduction 
of a social stability parameter that reflects some key features of xiagang such as a 
low likelihood of workers being laid off The likelihood oflayoffs could be lowered 
in the interest of social stability. 
A comparative static analysis is undertaken on this model. It shows that with an 
increase of this social stability parameter, the overall wages, unskilled worker's 
effort levels and their employment tend to rise, but the overall profit levels and 
skilled worker's effort levels tend to decline; Skilled worker' s employment, the 
overall output and productivity may either increase or decrease. This implies that 
profitability may be improved by lowering the social stability parameter, but that 
improvement is more likely to be realised through cutting labour costs at an expense 
of shifting more workers into xiagang rather than through improving the overall 
productivity. 
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